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Constitutional theorizing about social democracy might start from
several different places. Professor Robin West's wonderful
meditation on the possible constitutional significance of Martha
Nussbaum's work on capacity-based liberalism' begins by depicting
the best possible society. Professor West then explores the extent to
which the Constitution of the United States can and should be
interpreted consistently with this regime.- Professor Stephen Elkin
begins a careful study of the constitutional theories underlying the
American commercial republic by elaborating the principles
underlying a particular political regime. He starts from the
"circumstances of politics," focusing our attention on "a political
order that will garner wide-spread support in the form of civil peace,
and that will be widely thought a good or decent political order."3
Other theorists begin with an exegesis on particular strands of
American constitutional thought, or more commonly in the legal
profession, with a series of related judicial rulings handed down by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Professor William Forbath's
important work on welfare rights focuses on the historical relationship
in American constitutionalism between the tradition of equal
citizenship and the tradition of social citizenship.4 Frank Michelman's
seminal 1969 Harvard Law Review Foreword starts with certain
* Associate Professor of Government, University of Maryland at College Park. A.B.
1978, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1981, Columbia University; PhD. 1988, Yale
University. Thanks to Jim Fleming for organizing the conference, all the members of
the panel for their insights, and Keith Whittington, Rogers Smith and Howard
Gillman for their help.
1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach (2000).
2. Robin West, Rights and the State's Obligation to Secure the Material Pre-
Conditions of a Good Society, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1901, 1922-32 (2001) [hereinafter
West, Rights].
3. Stephen L. Elkin, The Constitutional Theory of the Comnercial Republic, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 1933,1941 (2001).
4. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste]; William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare
Rights: History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1821 (2001).
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Supreme Court decisions and seeks to offer the best possible
interpretation of their underlying principles. He "suggest[s] that the
judicial 'equality' explosion of recent times has largely been ignited by
reawakened sensitivity.., to a... value or claim which might better
be called 'minimum welfare."' 5  Michelman's work is better
understood, however, as synthesizing these different approaches to
constitutional theorizing. Thus, his Foreward, taking a "cue from
Professor Rawls' idea of 'justice as fairness,"' 6 defends a "proposition
about social justice" described as "'minimum protection against
economic hazard."' 7
Constitutional theorizing about social democracy might also begin
with Karl Llewellyn's observation that "there is no reaching a
judgment as to whether any specific part of present law does what it
ought, until you can first answer what it is doing now."8 Rather than
demonstrating that a particular progressive vision is rooted in the
Constitution, progressive constitutional theorists might first ponder
why the American polity has frequently rejected and, at best,
imperfectly implemented the practices and policies associated with
democratic socialism or social democracy.9  This approach to
constitutional theorizing promises to highlight the importance of
constitutional institutions as opposed to constitutional exegesis for the
constitutionalist enterprise. The answers to "Why is there no
Socialism in the United States""° and related questions indicate that
progressive failures throughout history cannot simply be ascribed to
either a constitution that does not mandate a fair degree of economic
equality or American unwillingness to recognize that the Constitution
does in fact mandate a greater degree of economic equality than has
ever been realized in the United States. Social scientists who study
American and comparative political economy emphasize the
structural barriers to social democracy intentionally or unintentionally
built into the design of American government institutions. Federalism
and the separation of powers, in particular, have placed distinct
obstacles in the path of social democrats. Progressive movements and
progressive policies often fail in the United States when they enjoy
approximately the same popular support as successful progressive
5. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 9 (1969).
6. Id. at 14-15.
7. Id. at 13.
8. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1223 (1931).
9. Michael Harrington points out that "social democracy and Socialism are not
synonymous." The "former" seeks "State intervention, planning and social priorities
within capitalism." The "latter" is "a political movement which seeks to transform
capitalism fundamentally." Michael Harrington, Foreword to Werner Sombart, Why
is there no Socialism in the United States?, at ix, xi (1976). Progressive constitutional
theorists are almost always social democrats, not democratic socialists.
10. See infra Part I.
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movements and progressive policies in other countries because for
institutional reasons progressive policies are much harder to pass and
implement in the United States than in other countries."
Whether constitutional institutions obstruct the enactment and
implementation of progressive policies is as much a fundamental
constitutional concern as whether some constitutional provision or the
Constitution as a whole requires government to adopt policies
associated with social democracy. Professor Elkin properly recognizes
that the constitutional theory of the good society must be one that
present institutions are well-designed to adopt and capable of
implementing. "The aim of constitutional theory," his article points
out, "is to specify the institutions needed to realize ['a conception of
justice'] and the political sociology that gives political energy to that
rule." 2  When constitutional theorists think about the material
preconditions of the good society in the United States, therefore, they
must recognize that progressive or other interpretive understandings
of constitutional political economy will be realized only when "citizens
of the political order.., are inclined to operate the institutions in the
necessary fashion." 3  Their constitutional visions must combine
textual exegesis, political philosophy, and empirical institutional
analysis. Aligning text and institutions often presents severe
difficulties. Most polities lack the governing institutions and political
support necessary to realize the ideal form of constitutional life.
This paper highlights probable mismatches between the
constitutional theories of social democracy eloquently detailed in the
previous article and the capacity of present constitutional institutions
to realize those visions. A system of "separated institutions sharing
powers"14 has proven a poor vehicle for passing and implementing
11. A more complete analysis of why no socialism in the United States would also
note that too many citizens are historically unwilling to support social welfare policies
whose primary beneficiaries are perceived to be persons of color. As Philip Klinker
and Rogers Smith point out, while "many [Americans] oppose[] big government on
principle, it seems undeniable that for many others, this threat to national initiatives
benefiting blacks [is] not irrelevant." Philip A. Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, The
Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America 298 (1999); see
Jennifer L. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and School
Desegregation, at xi-xii (1984) (citing the issue of race as essential to -Why is there no
socialism in the United States?"); Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism
Undermined the War on Poverty (1994) (exploring the connection between the lack
of success of American public policy programs and American perceptions of race).
This and other political sociology explanations for the American welfare state raise
fundamental constitutional questions associated with which people are capable of
sharing the same civic space. Space limitations, however, prevent any discussion of
this constitutional matter.
12. Elkin, supra note 3, at 1948.
13. Id. at 1937. This passage also points out that whatever the abstract merits of
some constitutional vision as a theory of justice or a theory of constitutional justice,
the vision must also be one that is shared by most citizens.
14. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The
1971
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measures associated with progressive or social democracy.
Federalism, by increasing the number of veto points and
decentralizing American politics, further confounds the progressive
constitutionalist. Future progressive constitutional theory may not,
therefore, rest content laying out the interpretive or Madisonian
foundations of social democracy. Scholars should also explore the
conditions under which present institutions might yield social
democracy or detail those institutional reforms necessary to create a
regime more favorable to progressive policies and politics.
Alternatively, progressive constitutional theorists may begin exploring
the best non-progressive regime that present institutions (which
include existing practices of constitutional interpretation), i5 might
yield.
The present incapacity of American institutions to produce
progressive policies is a constitutional problem, not merely a technical
problem with realizing a constitutional vision. The Framers
structured constitutional institutions not simply to produce good
government or fair outcomes, but to privilege certain policies and
certain interests. 6 "Constitutional rules," Robert Dahl notes, "help to
determine what particular groups are to be given advantages or
handicaps in the political struggle."' 7  Hence, one important
dimension of constitutional theory is the study of what policies
constitutional institutions were intended to privilege, what policies
those institutions have historically privileged, and whether those
institutions may be reformed so that they may either better serve their
original purposes or privilege a different set of policies. That some
Americans established constitutionally worthy ideals at extraordinary
times in American history does not provide a sufficient basis to
establish the constitutional theory of the good society, or the best
possible American society. Constitutional theory must also
demonstrate that American institutions are presently capable of
realizing those ideals in ordinary times.
All constitutional theories must align textual commitments and
institutional capacities. As the topic of this symposium is
constitutional issues as a material precondition to a good society, and
I believe the good society would be a progressive democracy, this
paper explores misalignments in the constitutional theory of social
democracy. Further, the papers for this symposium all endorse some
Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan 29 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
15. See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of
Civil Libertarianism 219-20 (1991); Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the 'New
Institutionalism', and the Future of Public Law, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89,91 (1988).
16. See infra Part III.
17. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 137 (1956). For an
outstanding meditation on this theme, see Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Theory and the Faces of Power, 9-15 (Sept. 28, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Fordham Law Review).
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version of progressive democracy. Had a libertarian been in the mix's
or the subject matter been different, only the particular details of the
underlying analysis would change. Government institutions and
political culture in the United States confound both libertarians and
social democrats. Federalism and the separation of powers place
similar barriers in the way of any coherent national policy. More
generally, constitutional theorists who begin by documenting more
than two hundred years of constitutional error" ought to consider
whether American institutions are designed to properly realize their
particular constitutional vision. One theme of this article is that any
theory of American institutions that historically has failed to resonate
with American practice is consequently not a good constitutional
theory. The consistent incapacity of American institutions to enact or
implement social democratic politics is the central challenge to
progressive constitutional theory, not the dubious claim that the
Constitution protects only negative rights.'
I. WHY No SOCIALISM (OR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY) IN THE UNITED
STATES
The apparent failure of socialism, related political movements, and
associated public policies to thrive in the United States has puzzled
political sociologists for almost two hundred years. Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels spent considerable intellectual energy first exploring
whether the United States was fertile soil for communism, and then
explaining why movements in that direction were not forthcoming.-
Werner Sombart's 1906 book, Why is there no Socialism in the United
States?' remains a social science classic both in the United States and
Europe. Seymour Martin Lipset has more recently devoted numerous
works to the question of American exceptionalism and the failure of
socialism to establish at least a beachhead on the western shores of
the Atlantic Ocean.' Lipset and other contemporary scholars
18. I gather some were invited.
19. For a particularly notorious claim that American judges have systemically
misinterpreted the Constitution, see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 19-128 (1990).
20. Professor West's paper clearly demonstrates that both the Constitution and
liberal theory protects some positive rights. West, Rights, supra note 2; see also Mark
A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law. Abortion, W elfare, and Liberal
Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. LJ. 731, 756-62 (1997) (questioning whether the
distinction between positive and negative rights is of any value). For the argument
that the Constitution safeguards only negative rights, see Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715
F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864,889-90 (1986).
21. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Why No Socialism in the United States? in 1
Radicalism in the Contemporary Age 32-47 (Seweryn Bialer ed., 1977).
22. Sombart, supra note 9.
23. See Seymour Martin Lipset & Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why
Socialism Failed in the United States (2000): Seymour Martin Lipset, American
1973
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highlight both the weaknesses of the socialist parties and the
weaknesses of social democratic policies in the United States.
Americans, they agree, neither vote in significant numbers for a
socialist party nor support to a significant degree the policies
championed by social democrats. One could stock a good-sized
library with books and articles explaining why Americans refuse to
adopt and implement policies that would assure the vast majority of
citizens meaningful jobs, adequate incomes and other basic goods
needed for human flourishing.24
Professor Forbath touches on some ideological and institutional
reasons historically given for the failure of social democracy in the
United States when he notes how "the hammer lock on Congress that
the Southern Democrats enjoyed by dint of their numbers, their
seniority, and their control over key committees" derailed popular
demands for social citizenship during the New Deal.' This claim is in
part about ideology during this era. Full employment failed because
crucial political actors rejected progressive economic policies. Had
Southern Democrats recognized the Fourteenth Amendment as the
foundation of social citizenship, they would have provided the votes
necessary to ensure that all citizens had access to meaningful work.
Forbath might also be making a point about the structure of governing
practices during the New Deal. Full employment failed, in this view,
because institutional rules enabled Southern Democrats to control
Congress and Congress to control lawmaking. Had democratic
practices in the United States been differently organized, Southern
Democrats might not have had the political power necessary to block
a popular mandate for full employment.26
Ideological and institutional explanations for dismal American
welfare practices offer obvious truths that constitutional thinkers
ignore to their peril. Progressive democracy would be realized if all
Americans were persuaded by the arguments presented by Professors
West, Michelman, Forbath, Elkin, or any other progressive
constitutionalist. Americans will enjoy a progressive renaissance
when Professor Elkin persuades the appropriate powers to restructure
present institutions in ways that privilege social democratic policies.
Most progressive theorists, however, focus almost exclusively on
ideological barriers to social democracy, attempting to make better or
more persuasive arguments for a progressive interpretation of the
Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (1996); Seymour Martin Lipset, Roosevelt
and the Protest of the 1930s, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 273, 273 n.* (1983) (citing his other
works on this subject) [hereinafter Lipset, Roosevelt].
24. Some of this literature is discussed elsewhere. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text, and infra notes 25,26 and 38 and accompanying text.
25. Forbath, Caste, supra note 4, at 76.
26. Forbath provides a third, sociological interpretation of why full employment
failed. His emphasis on the Southern Democrats highlights how progressive politics
may be defeated when they challenge the racial status quo. Id. at 76-89.
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Constitution. This practice may have reached the point of diminishing
political returns. Proponents of social democracy might more
successfully advance their progressive constitutional ambitions for the
foreseeable future by identifying, correcting or learning to work
within the institutional barriers to social democracy in the United
States.
II. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
Progressive constitutionalists emphasize and seek to overcome the
ideological barriers to social democracy. As their writings point out,
Americans do not enjoy a greater measure of social equality because
crucial political actors, Supreme Court justices in particular, have
never interpreted the Constitution as mandating that greater measure
of social equality. Professor West complains that "[liberal-
constitutional rights, as they are now conventionally understood and
authoritatively interpreted, at least in the United States, do not
obligate the state to ensure anything resembling what welfarist 'good
society' advocates envision." "Worse," she adds, "liberal
constitutional rights, as they are sometimes authoritatively interpreted
in this country and others, actually limit the state's authority to take
action to secure the material preconditions of the good society.' '
Progressives will remove these obstacles to social democracy when
they persuade those crucial political actors that liberal constitutional
rights require government officials to adopt policies associated with
social democracy. Constitutional shortcomings, in their view, are best
remedied by making more persuasive constitutional arguments for
social democracy.'
All schools of constitutional thought similarly conflate
constitutional theory and constitutional interpretation. When law
professors identify a constitutional flaw in public policy, they believe
the underlying cause to be that the Constitution has been
misinterpreted. Abortion is legal throughout the United States, pro-
life constitutionalists complain, because the Supreme Court
misinterpreted the Constitution in Planned Parenthood of
27. West, Rights, supra note 2, at 1904 (emphasis in original).
28. Professor West has played a vital role in persuading progressives that their
constitutional arguments ought to be pitched at the citizenry, rather than almost
exclusively at Supreme Court justices. See Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism:
Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment 281-89 (1994). Still, her progressive
constitutionalism and those of other progressives concerned with the Constitution
outside of the courts is almost entirely focused on explaining how the Constitution
might be interpreted as supporting progressive policies and not with detailing whether
constitutional institutions are particularly good vehicles for realizing progressive
policies. For an important exception, see Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution
Away From the Courts (1999) (proposing that courts are not good vehicles for
realizing populist constitutional law).
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 9 and Roe v. Wade. 0 State and
federal officials permit discrimination against homosexuals, advocates
of gay rights believe, because neither those officials nor a Supreme
Court majority realize that the Constitution forbids such
discrimination. Constitutional theorists critique these faulty
interpretations by demonstrating the superior philosophical and
constitutional groundings of their constitutional vision in ways that
will persuade those who are making good faith constitutional
mistakes, and expose those constitutional charlatans who are bending
the Constitution for their private purposes. Some people may never
be persuaded. That problem, however, is one of "constitutional bad
faith,' 31 and not a manifestation of a more fundamental kind of
constitutional flaw.
The problem with these endless efforts to refine the jurisprudential
and philosophical case for social democracy, other progressive
policies, or any other political cause, may be that such scholarship
reaches the point of diminished political and practical returns long
before reaching the point of diminished intellectual returns. Efforts to
ground welfare rights in liberal capabilities, the Madisonian
commercial republic, or full citizenship provide progressive
constitutionalists with an intellectually fresh and interesting approach
to constitutional political economy. The distinction between social
and equal citizenship, or between liberal and republican foundations
for welfare rights, however, is more likely to adjust the views of
persons already committed to progressive democracy than to increase
that cadre. The American experience with abortion, at least, suggests
that the proliferation of new arguments on both sides of an issue is
unlikely to change substantially the balance of either public or elite
opinion." Many new arguments for and against reproductive choice,
and for and against social democracy, offer original perspectives on
important subjects. Still, the vast majority of academics who advance
new progressive constitutional claims should recognize that their
arguments are academic, in the best and worst senses of the term.33
The precise impact of both new constitutional arguments and
refinements on existing constitutional arguments has rarely been
studied with any empirical rigor. During the panel discussion,
Professor West challenged my notion of diminishing political returns,
forcefully arguing that the debate from liberal capabilities might have
29. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Forbath, Caste, supra note 4, at 6.
32. See Mark A. Graber, Rethinking Abortion: Equal Choice, the Constitution,
and Reproductive Politics 37-38 (1996).
33. The cash value of different arguments for social democracy is likely to be
small. As Elkin notes, "it is unlikely that any differences in the conception of liberal
justice will point law-making down substantially different paths." Elkin, supra note 3,
at 1956.
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influenced the recent controversies over welfare reform and Second
Amendment jurisprudence in the lower federal courts.' Her evidence
is speculative. So is mine. The best that might be said is that in the
absence of any evidence that better constitutional arguments will
advance the cause of social democracy, social democrats might instead
explore whether the dismal state of American welfare policies might
have constitutional causes other than legal and electoral failures to be
guided by progressive arguments.
Nonetheless, efforts by progressives and others to refine further
justifications for constitutional visions do make some political sense,
even when diminished political returns are taken into consideration.
Social democracy does not exist in the United States because most
Americans accept more capitalistic norms. The United States would
be a more egalitarian society if Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Albert Gore, George W. Bush, and most American citizens could be
persuaded that the Constitution obligates the government to adopt
more progressive policies. Understood less ambitiously, progressive
constitutional theorists are engaging in a constructive dialogue over
what the left should do if and when the left were ever in a position to
determine welfare policies in the United States. Exploring the judicial
responsibility to realize progressive democracy, a rather silly endeavor
if understood as aimed at converting the present Court, may shape
decisively the legal conscience of the next generation of liberal
justices. Progressive constitutionalists are thus constructing a
"Shadow Constitution,"35 an effort analogous to construction of the
shadow cabinets established by the party out of power in the United
Kingdom.
The practice of constitutional theory as constitutional interpretation
also reflects an appropriate division of academic labor. Law
professors (and political theorists) are experts in making arguments
about constitutional political economy and interpreting texts. The
institutional prerequisites of social democracy, however, are outside
their bailivick. Such a determination is a task for more empirically
oriented social scientists. That progressive constitutional theorists are
best able to correct jurisprudential misunderstandings inhibiting
progressive democracy does not entail a belief that these
misunderstandings are the main reason why social democracy has not
flourished in the United States. Progressive constitutional theory is
grounded only in the belief that progressive constitutionalists are best
able to knock down jurisprudential barriers to social democracy, and
not in the belief that those barriers are the main bar to social
democracy in the United States.
34. See transcript on file with the Fordam Law Review.
35. J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1703, 1710 (1997).
1977
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This argument on the division of academic labor identifies
constitutional theory too closely with constitutional interpretation.
That practice has been expanding in recent years as, inspired by the
Princeton school of constitutional thought, scholars have recognized
that constitutional theorists may ask "WHAT is the Constitution that
is to be interpreted," and "WHO are its authoritative interpreters," as
well as "HOW do (and should) they go about their interpretive
tasks."36  Still, this expansion of the scope of constitutional
interpretation hardly exhausts constitutional theory. The core of the
constitutionalist project is to design institutions that privilege some
results at the expense of others. While constitutionalism highlights
such questions of political philosophy, as what ought to be the goals of
a good society, it also raises questions of social science, such as what
institutions are most likely to reach those or more feasible goals at
given times and places. When a polity consistently refuses for a long
period of time to adopt certain policies, the constitutional reason is
probably not simply a coincidental and unfortunate combination of
constitutional mistake and constitutional bad faith. Rather, the better
inference is either that the Constitution was not designed to privilege
those policies or that the Constitution has a severe design flaw.
III. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Forbath's observation that Dixiecrats in Congress frustrated
President Roosevelt's efforts to secure a full employment bill provides
an institutional explanation for the failure of progressive democracy in
the United States.3 7  Had governing institutions been structured
differently, Dixiecrats would not have had the political power
necessary to foil popular demands for social citizenship. Professor
Elkin offers a similar institutional explanation, claiming that
unwarranted economic inequalities exist in the United States partly
because business enterprise presently exercises too much power in the
American polity.38 The Elkin article does not maintain either that
persons who control productive assets are making constitutional
mistakes or that the Chamber of Commerce acts in bad constitutional
faith. Instead, he argues that our institutional design is faulty, and
that public policy must reflect a better balance between the concerns
of a secure and confident middle class and the concerns of a business
class whose privileged position is more modest.39 Social democrats
informed by Forbath's work might similarly call for a more equitable
distribution of power in Congress. These progressive constitutional
36. Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming & Sotirios A. Barber, American
Constitutional Interpretation, at v (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis in original).
37. Forbath, Caste, supra note 4, at 82-85.
38. Elkin, supra note 3, at 1964-67.
39. Id.
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reforms are aimed at the process by which policy is made, not at
beliefs about what policies should be made.
Institutions matter. Both the Forbath and Elkin papers highlight
how the structure of government decision-making influences public
choices among different constitutional visions. Were business
enterprise to have less political power, more progressive policies
might result without an accompanying change in anyone's policy
preferences. American political economy might be more egalitarian
had the Constitution vested absolute power in either President
Roosevelt or Professor Elkin. More seriously, other governing
arrangements equally consistent with American democratic values
would have yielded more social democratic policies during the New
Deal and perhaps at other times in American history. Simple majority
rule would have sufficed to bring more social democracy to the United
States during the 1940s.4° Americans would likely enjoy greater
economic equality if business enjoyed a less privileged position than at
present.
The persons responsible for the Constitution recognized that
institutional design played the central role in securing wise and just
government. They understood that Americans would not always be
governed by persons guided by the best principles of constitutional
political economy. "Enlightened statesmen," Madison famously
declared, "will not always be at the helm.' While every effort was
made to constitutionalize practices that would most likely result in the
best persons obtaining public office,42 the Framers attempted to create
governing institutions that would maximize good government even
when the governors were not particularly good. As Hamilton
proclaimed in The Federalist No. 31, "all observations founded upon
the danger of usurpation, ought to be referred to the composition and
structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its
powers.
4 3
Leading Federalists also advised against limiting power textually
because they regarded constitutional language, standing alone, as an
ineffective means for restraining public officials.' Madison, Jack
Rakove documents, "simply regarded the adoption of a federal bill of
rights as an irrelevant antidote to the real dangers that republican
40. Forbath, Caste, supra note 4, at 1, 6.
41. The Federalist No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
42. The Federalist No. 30, at 193 (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist No. 57, at
384-85 (James Madison), The Federalist No. 64, at 433,437 (John Jay), The Federalist
No. 68, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton), The Federalist No. 76 at 510,512-13 (Alexander
Hamilton).
43. The Federalist No. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton).
44. See Jack N. Rakove, Parchment Barriers and the Politics of Rights, in A
Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, Politics, and Law- 1791 and 1991,
at 130-37 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
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politics would generate."45  Many Framers felt similarly. Roger
Sherman informed New Englanders that "[n]o bill of rights ever yet
bound the supreme power longer than the honey moon of a new
married couple, unless the rulers were interested in preserving the
rights. 4 6  Mere legal recognition could not secure fundamental
liberties in the long run, other Federalists declared, because
parchment declarations could be ignored or rescinded.47 "[N]either
would a general declaration of rights be any security," Civic Rusticus
wrote, "for the sovereign who made it could repeal it."4 Whether
economic or political rights were protected, all agreed, depended on
institutional design and political culture. The "security [for rights],"
Hamilton bluntly stated, "whatever fine declarations may be inserted
in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public
opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the
government.
49
Hamilton regarded "the [C]onstitution" as "A BILL OF RIGHTS"
in part because it "specif[ied] the political privileges of the citizens in
the structure and administration of the government.... "50 Forty years
after ratification, Madison reminded delegates to the Virginia State
Constitutional Convention that "'[t]he only effectual safeguard to the
rights of the minority, must be laid in such a basis and structure of the
Government itself."'' 51 Rather than limit government legally, the
Framers of the Constitution of 1787 sought to restrict national power
and protect individual rights by ensuring that only persons of
particular abilities and interests made political decisions. As Herbert
Storing noted nearly two hundred years later, "the substance [of the
45. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 316, 325-27, 332-35, 334 (1996) ("Madison saw little evidence that the
state declaration of rights had any efficacy in securing their avowed objects.")
[hereinafter Rakove, Original Meanings].
46. Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists- 1787-1788,
at 180 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998) (emphasis in original);
see also Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 45, at 327 (agreeing that the
Federalists believed that the system of representation safeguarded democracy rather
than any written bill of rights).
47. See 8 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Virginia I, at 308, 438 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) [hereinafter 8 Documentary History]; 9
Documentary History, at 975; 10 Documentary History, at 1196-97, 1333-34.
48. 8 Documentary History, at 334; see id., at 337.
49. The Federalist No. 84, at 580 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
50. Id. at 581 (emphasis added); see Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged:
The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era: Police Powers Jurisprudence 203 (1993);
Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, in 1982: The
Supreme Court Review 66 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1983) (the Framers
recognized that "the most efficient way to limit power was not to withhold powers-
although they did that too-but to organize power in a particular way.").
51. Charles S. Sydnor, 5 A History of the South: The Development of Southern
Sectionalism 1819-1848, at 279 (1948).
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Constitution] is a design of government with powers to act and a
structure arranged to make it act wisely and responsibly. It is in that
design, not in its preamble or its epilogue," he emphasized, "that the
security of American civil and political liberty lies." -2
This Madisonian perspective offers several reasons why social
democrats should move from thinking about textual guarantees for
progressive policies to the institutional foundations of progressive
politics. Original constitutional theory provides both interpretive and
pragmatic reasons why progressive constitutionalists must worry at
least as much about whether constitutional institutions at present are
particularly good vehicles for achieving and maintaining a social
democracy as whether some constitutional provision or the
Constitution as a whole mandates social democracy. The Constitution
of 1787, as interpreted by Publius, did not textually guarantee the
material preconditions of the good society. Rather, the constitutional
concern underlying The Federalist Papers is whether government is
structured in ways most likely to yield a sound political economy.
Publian constitutionalism adds that even if the Constitution of 1787 or
an amended Constitution at some later date guaranteed the material
preconditions of the good society, that parchment provision would be
a mere scrap of paper in the absence of the institutional capacity to
provide the requisite assistance. The right to the material
preconditions of the good society is valuable only if institutional
capacity and commitment exist to realize that right.
Considerable contemporary scholarship has emphasized that
American governing institutions, in practice, have obstructed
socialism and social democratic policies, and that constitutional
institutions at present have only a limited capacity for fostering
progressive policies. Both socialism and social democracy typically
require a strong, politically active labor movement. Late nineteenth
century efforts to fashion such a movement were frustrated by the
constitutional structures established in 1787. Victoria Hattam is one
of several scholars who insists that "business unionism... was the
product of the distinctive institutional structure of the American
state."53 In her view, American laborers began emphasizing private
bargains wvith employers rather than governmental reforms aimed at
full employment because the American practice of "judicial regulation
of industrial conflict" meant that "even successful political campaigns
could not ensure a corresponding change in government policy toward
52. Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in How Does the
Constitution Secure Rights? 35 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds.,
1985); see also Walter Berns, The Constitution as Bill of Rights, in How Does the
Constitution Secure Rights?, supra, at 59-65.
53. Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power. The Origins of Business
Unionism in the United States, at ix (1993).
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labor."'  Forbath believes that "courts, legal doctrine and language,
and legal violence played a crucial, irreducible part in shaping the
modem American labor movement."55 George Lovell challenges this
view, suggesting that the legislation struck down by courts was not as
friendly to labor as labor sometimes suggested, and would not have
been passed had some legislators not been somewhat confident of
adverse judicial interpretation. 6 Still, most commentators generally
agree that the particular way in which politics was organized during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a significant
role in the realization and frustration of social democratic policies.
"[S]tructural features of the U.S. state," Lovell concludes, "require
that a very high threshold be crossed before political influence leads
to real changes in policy. 57
Institutional analysis plays crucial roles in more general analyses of
why there is no social democracy in the United States. Sombart's
seminal study places great emphasis on the two-party system. A
strong labor party did not develop in the United States, in his view,
because Americans were reluctant to throw away their votes on third
parties and because the two major parties were typically willing to co-
opt less radical worker demands and worker leaders.5 8  Lipset
highlights how Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal was able to
co-opt more radical democracy by incorporating moderate worker
demands in his program. "[T]he effects of a two-party electoral
system centered on the direct election of the President," Lipset
declares, "have made it extremely difficult for any group to channel
social discontent into an independent third party that appeals to class
interests."59
Contemporary scholars place particular emphasis on the ways
American federalism has contributed to the failure of progressive
democracy. David Brian Robertson claims that "American federalism
retarded state social expenditure, skewed policy design, and erected
obstacles to the enactment of public health insurance in any state."'6
A race to the bottom took place during the Progressive era, he
observes, when states considering health and other legislation
considered that businesses might respond to more progressive laws by
moving to states with less imposing and less expensive legislation.
Americans might have supported progressive health policies had a
54. Id.
55. William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 3
(1991).
56. George Lovell, The Ambiguities of Labor's Legislative Reforms in New York
State in the Late Nineteenth Century, 8 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 81, 82 (1994).
57. Id. at 83.
58. Sombart, supra note 9, at 33-54.
59. Lipset, Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 274.
60. David Brian Robertson, The Bias of American Federalism: The Limits of
Welfare-State Development in the Progressive Era, 1 J. Pol'y Hist. 261, 261 (1989).
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national option been available, but the competition for business
fostered by federalism compelled many legislators to support less
progressive policies than they perhaps believed were warranted.
Scholars also hold federalism responsible for weak national parties, as
candidates for state and national legislative offices tailor their policy
prescriptions to local needs. "American decentralized political
parties," Robertson and other scholars note, "worked against
centralized, uniform social policy designs."6
These institutional explanations are particularly powerful during
those historical periods when American citizens held the same
commitment to social democracy as citizens in other countries where
social democratic policies thrived. Robertson notes that during the
early twentieth century "the gap between the American and
European welfare state widened significantly," even though "the
forces for social reform ... in the United States... resembled those in
England, which at the time was laying the foundations for a model
welfare state."62  His study of health policies concludes that
Americans could not achieve a social democracy during the twentieth
century because American institutions required social democratic
measures to have greater support than European institutions." Sven
Steinmo similarly notes that had the United States had a
parliamentary rather than a presidential system of government during
the middle twentieth century, the United States would most likely be
enjoying European-style social democracy. "Consider for a moment
how different America's social welfare state would be today," he
declares:
[I]f Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy,
and Lyndon Johnson could have called the Democratic party
leadership together, and with this small group of elites, could have
designed and implemented social welfare policies.., without
needing to tailor these programs to the demands or objections of
particular members of Congress and the interest groups they
represented. 64
Social democracy, in this view, failed in the United States because
social democrats had to overcome more hurdles than their
counterparts in other countries. Had England been a presidential
state with numerous constitutionally autonomous federal districts and
the United States a parliamentary system, scholars might be puzzling
over why the English do not enjoy American-style social democracy.
61. Id. at 271.
62. Id. at 261.
63. Id. at 285-86.
64. Sven H. Steinmo, American Exceptionalisin Reconsidered: Culture or
Institutions?, in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations
127 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1994).
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Progressive constitutional theory should acknowledge the mismatch
between the constitutional obligation to secure the material
preconditions of the good society and the capacity of constitutional
institutions to enact and implement the progressive policies that social
democrats believe necessary to realize that constitutional end.
American constitutional institutions place unique obstacles in the path
of social democrats seeking social reform. European socialists must
simply win control of the national legislature. Social democrats in the
United States must gain and maintain control of the presidency,
House, Senate, federal judiciary and a substantial majority of state
governments. The same "fragmentation of political authority" that
prevents coherent policy-making also promotes incoherent policy
implementation.65 Gerald Rosenberg has famously demonstrated that
courts in the United States are almost never capable of implementing
broad scale progressive reform.16 Those who claim that the judicial
incapacity to promote social democracy proves that such matters
should be left to the elected branches of government 67 overlook social
science evidence suggesting that the elected branches of government
are similarly incapable of implementing broad scale social reform
whenever significant opposition to that reform exists.61 Moreover,
scholars note, government institutions poorly designed to do a task
tend to foster blanket assertions that government should not be
responsible for that task. Some scholarship on welfare suggests that
institutional incapacity, rather than ideology, is the primary source of
American hostility to progressive social policy. "[W]hen a state does
something badly," Steinmo's analysis of redistributive politics astutely
concludes, "this becomes an argument for why the state should do
less."69
That constitutional institutions presently obstruct the realization of
progressive policies hardly refutes claims that the Constitution
permits or even mandates some form of democratic socialism. Few
constitutional institutions presently promote their original purposes
efficiently. The Senate, expected to resemble the Presidency, soon
morphed into a legislative body much like the House of
Representatives. 70 Electors were originally expected to exercise some
judgment.71  They do not and never have. Thus, nothing in
65. Id.
66. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991) (attributing courts' failure to implement significant social reform to
their dependence on political support and lack of implementation powers).
67. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court 259 (1999).
68. See Jeffrey L. Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation 128-46 (1973).
69. Steinmo, supra note 64, at 127.
70. Elaine K. Swift, The Making of an American Senate: Reconstitutive Change
in Congress, 1787-1841, at 140 (1996).
71. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.
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constitutional theory forbids claims that constitutional institutions are
suffering from diminished capacity to realize their original
constitutional purposes. The point is that after 200 years no one
should blithely assume that ancient constitutional institutions are the
best, worthy, or even adequate means for realizing constitutional
purposes. The new "science of politics" promised by The Federalist
Papers may be antiquated. Institutions thought to be the best means
to promote human flourishing may no longer do so because they were
poorly designed or because intervening changes have reduced their
utility.
IV. NEW CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The present constitutional system in the United States gives social
democrats three means for achieving their purposes. They might
simply try harder. American progressives might accept that they must
be more persuasive than social democrats elsewhere to overcome the
Constitution's unfortunate institutional barriers to progressive policy.
Alternatively, social democrats might adjust their proposals to existing
constitutional institutions. Rather than ask what is the best
constitutional understanding of the material preconditions of the good
society, progressive constitutionalists might ask what is the best
constitutional understanding of the material preconditions of the good
society that American constitutional institutions are presently capable
of realizing. Finally, social democrats may seek to adjust
constitutional institutions to satisfy their constitutional visions. Some
legislative means exist for reducing the number of veto points that
obstruct social democratic measures. Strengthening congressional
leadership at the expense of sub-committees, for example, might
facilitate more social welfare legislation if the left ever regained
control of Congress. Other efforts to realize progressive politics may
require constitutional amendments or more fundamental restructuring
of the constitutional order. Abandoning federalism, for example,
would probably mean abandoning the Constitutions of 1787 and 1868.
The next generation of progressive constitutionalists should
encourage progressives to choose among these approaches.
Constitutional theorists who engage in this commentary should not
reduce questions about the material conditions of the good society to
questions about the constitutional responsibilities of government.
Progressive constitutionalists must also engage in the serious
empirical analysis necessary to determine the most progressive
policies that present American institutions are capable of passing,
implementing and maintaining, as well as the most progressive
institutional reforms contemporary Americans are willing to support.
1961).
72. The Federalist No. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Such analyses should recognize that many institutional reforms that
increase the likelihood that progressive policies will be passed and
implemented also increase the likelihood that regressive policies will
be passed and implemented. The same system of multiple veto points
that frustrates social democrats also frustrates libertarians. Ronald
Reagan could not make further dents in the social safety net partly
because Democrats continued to control enough veto points in
government to prevent really radical proposals from becoming law or
being implemented.7 3 Institutional reforms that potentially promote
some progressive causes may have other dangerous side effects. As
Professor Elkin points out strengthening institutions that prevent
factional government may make it harder to serve the public interest,
as power is dispersed that must be concentrated if there is to be any
sustained effort to serve these broad concerns. 74  Providing
constitutional actors with a realistic appraisal of the actual
beneficiaries of institutional reforms is thus a vital task for progressive
constitutional theory. Otherwise, the left risks fighting for measures
that in practice will empower the right.75
CONCLUSION
The Framers of the Constitution promised a new science of politics,
one "by which the excellencies of republican government may be
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. 7 6 Contemporary
constitutionalists, oblivious to the Publian disdain for parchment
barriers, substitute textual exegesis and political philosophy for the
political science of the foundation generation. The result is
theoretical literature that asserts constitutional promises that present
constitutional institutions may be unable to keep. The Framers would
have rejected this practice of reducing constitutional theory to
constitutional interpretation. "Having learned so much from the
experience of a mere decade of self-government, and having
celebrated their own ability to act from 'reflection and choice,"' Jack
Rakove notes, "would they not find the idea that later generations
could not improve upon their discoveries incredible?"77
Constitutional theory needs a new science of politics, one that
promises to inform both progressive and other constitutional theorists
whether the wonderful ideals they find in the Constitution remain
73. Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, 106 Pol. Sci.
Q. 617,620 (1991).
74. Elkin, supra note 3, at 1961-63.
75. See Mark A. Graber, Conflicting Representations: Lani Guinier and James
Madison on Electoral Systems, 13 Const. Comment. 291 (1996) (suggesting that
conservative evangelicals, not persons of color, will be the main beneficiaries of
Professor Guinier's institutional reforms of the American electoral system).
76. The Federalist No. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
77. Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 45, at 367.
1986 [Vol. 69
2001] SOCIAL DEMOCRACY& CONS TFl TIONAL THEORY
capable of being realized by the present Constitution. "A neutral and
durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever," John
Hart Ely might have said, "[b]ut if it lacks connection with any
[constitutional institution] ... it is not a constitutional principle."'
78. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
Yale L.J. 920,949 (1973).
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